Archives for posts with tag: affect

Film Studies, Affect and Ethics

Victoria Grace Walden

In-keeping with Mona’s recent ’10 things I know about…’ blogs, I have accepted the challenge of attempting to summarise my own research in such a way. Here are 10 thoughts about affect and film scribed without reference to notes or quotation:

  1. Film phenomenologists such as Vivian Sobchack consider ‘affect’ to be the corporeal relationship between spectator and film;
  2. Laura Marks focuses specifically on the notion of haptic visuality (and briefly haptic aurality) considering the ability of the camera to ‘graze’ rather than gaze over surfaces, textures and spaces –to bring us closer to things which provoke sensuous memories of touch or movement;
  3. Psychologist Tomkin considers ‘affect’ to refer to intensity changes rooted inside the body;
  4. While, phenomenologists consider affect in relation to bodily reactions, it has often been used as an umbrella term of emotions, feelings and mood;
  5. Cognitive film theory, in its thinking about emotions, might be considered to identify ‘affect’ as related to character- or narrative-identification. Such thinking reinforces Christian Metz’s notions that the cinema screen is an illusionary, post-Lacanian mirror where we identify with a fantastical Other;
  6. This approach would suggest we respond to the diegesis as ‘that world over there’ –a hermeneutically closed space;
  7. If we are positioned outside the space of meaning-making during the film experience, it could be suggested that it is the film, not us, that is the ethical subject because the audience is considered a passive consumer of the film’s message. In this sense, Catherine Wheatley suggests that Hollywood-style narrative films encourage the spectator to only consider ethical questions after the film has finished and such questions tend to relate to the final consequences of narrative actions;
  8. However, sometimes films are playful with style, montage and reflexive in such ways that they slip between emotionally and critically engaging the spectator, and in doing so, turn the spectator’s attention towards their own body as well as the film’s. Thus, according to Wheatley, such films encourage spectators to confront their position as a participant during the experience. These films might be considered to be ‘morally consequent’ (to use Wheatley’s term);
  9. Ergo we might consider affect and ethics as intertwining concepts: when we watch a film we are an ethically inscribed body; we are embodied in the film experience as an ethical being. Ethics is after all, always inscribed in the actions we perform in our life;
  10. By turning our attention to the film experience rather than the film text we are turning towards a study of the ethical relationship between film and spectator.
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An exploration of the term ‘affect’ and what it offers to embodiment research.

I am exploring the term ‘affect’ and what it might offer to my understanding of embodied experience. In this post, I consider how affect is talked about in research and think about the best way to use the concept in my own research on embodiment and digital environments.

Hudlicka (2003) presents affect as an essential aspect of embodied interaction with digital environments. Hudlicka uses the term ‘affect’ interchangeably with ‘emotion’. Thus, the need for computers to detect user affect is equivalent to their recognition of user emotion (whether the user is happy, sad, angry etc.). Similarly, Johnson and Wiles (2003) talk about the ‘positive affect’ associated with playing computer games and equate this with happiness, engagement or ‘flow’ (Csikszentmihalyi, 1992).

But Shouse (2005) argues that the terms ‘affect’, ‘emotion’ and ‘feeling’ must be understood and presented as distinct from one another. He suggests that while feeling and emotion are subject to recognition and labeling on the part of those who experience them, affect is a more simple individual response: ‘a prepersonal intensity corresponding to the passage from one experiential state of the body to another’. Affect is a one-dimensional spike in the intensity of experience.

If we use this definition, what distinguishes affect from arousal? Is Shouse simply arguing for the importance of measuring the physiological arousal of users? My understanding is that affect is more than arousal because it implies the existence of an external cause. An individual might experience an increase in arousal as a result of a fleeting image that passes through their mind, but affect is a consequence of being affected by another body, by something external. So, focusing on affect involves looking at not just the affective response but also at the stimulus that has caused it: the music that has moved us, or the image that has led to a pre-conscious experiential shift.

In the context of my research on embodiment and digital environments, I am interested in affect because pre-conscious responses to the external world are a vital part of user experience. But looking at the work of Shouse has convinced me that the pre-conscious nature of affect means that it cannot be measured by asking users to label their feelings or by recording visible emotions that I observe. On the other hand, measures of physiological arousal can offer some insight into affect but do not tell the whole story. To ‘get at’ affect requires looking at indicators of the intensity of experience (including physiological arousal, facial expression, vocalisations and other bodily cues) and linking these to the environment that surrounds the user.

References 

Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1992) Flow: The Psychology of Happiness. London: Random House.

Hudlicka, E. (2003) To feel or not to feel: The role of affect in human–computer interaction. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 59(1), 1-32.

Jonhson, D. M. & Wiles, J. (2003) Effective Affective User Interface Design in Games. Ergonomics, 46 (13/14), 1332 – 1345.

Shouse, E. (2005) Feeling, emotion, affect. M/C Journal, 8 (6), 26. Accessed online 24.08.2013: http://www.journal.media-culture.org.au/0512/03-shouse.php

An overview of upcoming conferences and other research events which may be of interest to those researching embodiment and affect. 

by Victoria Grace Walden

 1) Being non/human discussion group in London, UK

An inter-disciplinary discussion group for postgraduate students and early career researchers. Possible topics could include, but are not limited to:

• The human as a distinct entity

• The posthuman

• The animal / ‘animot’

• Nature and Ecomaterialism

• ‘Thing Theory’, ‘Object Oriented Ontology’ – what does it mean to be an ‘object’ or ‘thing’?

• Metamorphoses, hybrids, monsters

• The nonhuman as an incorporeal being

• Automata, simulations, technology

 The initial call for papers has now passed, but for more information contact: being.non.human@gmail.com             

 

2) Trauma: Theory and Practice Conference, Prague, Czech Republic

Saturday 22nd March – Tuesday 25th March 2014

Themes include:

  • Public and Political Trauma
  • Personal and Individual Trauma
  • Diagnosing and Treating Trauma
  • Theorising Trauma
  • Representing Trauma

 300 word abstracts due by Friday 11th October 2013

Full draft papers due by Friday 17th January 2014

 For more information visit: http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/at-the-interface/evil/trauma/call-for-papers/

 

 3) 2014 Humanities Symposium, Affect and Inquiry at University of Iowa, USA

March 27th– 29th 2014

Call for papers about topics including:

  • The roles of technology and science in shaping the sensory dimension of inquiry
  • The affects of production, interaction, experience, and spectatorship in film, art and literature
  • Historiography, performance, sport, photography, psychology, sociology, and medicine
  • Anti-racist, queer, feminist, socio-economic, and postcolonial critiques of reason
  • Engage scholarship in local communities; engaged and experimental pedagogies
  • Interdisciplinary collaboration across methods, personalities and fields
  • Critiques of affect studies and the challenges of studying “precognition”

 Abstracts should be submitted to affectandinquiry@uiowa.edu by September 15th 2013

For more information visit: http://obermann.uiowa.edu/2013-2014-affect-and-inquiry/call-papers

 

4) Society for Phenomenology and Media, Furtwangen and Freiburg, Germany

March 12th– 15th 2014

Call for Papers which are organised around a specific media, for example: film, the Internet, mobile communication, medieval manuscripts, print media, stage drama, television, visual art, dance etc.

The Society for Phenomenology and Media encourages interdisciplinary approaches and theoretical diversity. Papers need not be limited to phenomenological approaches. Past papers have come from diverse theoretical perspectives, including critical theory, cultural studies, hermeneutics, Marxism, New Historicism, post-colonial theory, pragmatism, semiotics, speech-act theory, and others.

 Abstracts should be submitted by October 20th 2013

Papers accepted and presented are published in Glimpse, the annual publication of SPM.

For more information visit: http://societyphenmedia.wix.com/socphenmedia#!info

 

Highlights and thoughts regarding embodiment, affect, film and media from this year’s conference

by Victoria Grace Walden

Conference director Phillip Drummond hospitably accommodated more than 150 speakers, including key note presenters professors Laura Mulvey and Toby Miller alongside Dr. Cathy Ross, Jeremy Black and film and television writer Joe Ahearne at this year’s Film and Media conference. Below I share just some of the highlights which refer to issues of affect and embodiment.

Dr. Cathy Ross’s (Museum of London) opening keynote on Thursday explored how the city museum incorporates new technology into its museum spaces. She discussed the museum’s augmented reality phone app which allows users to see “this spot in history” at certain places in the capital. Then explained how digital imagery and film were used in a variety of exhibitions, discussing the mixed reactions of visitors in some areas such as the slavery gallery and the Blitz.

Dr. Ross touched on how our perception and desires of museum spaces are changing. Visitors expect interaction and emotional experiences in museums and the more traditional “knowledge” online. This made me reflect: what is knowledge? Do we always have to consider it as a cognitive asset? Can becoming submerged in interactive experiences that provoke emotions and sensations not offer a corporeal form of “knowledge”? Are we moving into an age which we might define by this “new knowledge”?

Also, how do/ can we engage with affect and the historical in museum spaces though media? What are the limitations? What are the ethical implications? Are there any topics where the digital and moving image could be deemed inappropriate?

I’ll be focusing on some of these issues in a future blog after visiting some of London’s museum sites this summer.

Mason Kamana Allred (University of California Berkeley, USA)  spoke at the “Spectacles of History 1” panel about Ernst Lubitsch’s Madam Dubarry (1919) questioning whether cinema could offer a new form of history to traditional, epistemological and scientific representations of the past. He linked the work of Frank Ankersmit on sublime historical experience to the phenomenological ideas of Vivian Sobchack in order to explore a prelinguistic, subjective history that perhaps can be felt at the cinema.

Three other papers which particularly grabbed my attention and jointly encouraged me to think about my relationship with the screen were Dr Douglas Keesey’s (California Polytechnic State University, USA)  discussion of the illusion of choice and morality regarding death in the Final Destination franchise; Elena Wooley’s (King’s College, London)  paper on disaster movies and the use of surrogates) for suffering in films of the genre in order to translate terror into entertainment (such as spectacularly collapsing buildings rather than close-ups of human victims); and Dr Sian Mitchell’s (SAE, Australia) exploration of her experience of a delayed (or continuous) affect after watching Lars Von Trier’s Melancholia (2010).

These three papers raised questions about how I relate to bodies on screen. In the Final Destination films I discover, like the characters, I cannot cheat death. As such, the diegeses of the films extend beyond the frame as my understanding of real life is affected by the actions on screen. In films such as 2012 (Emmerich, 2009), I see only the protagonists up-close therefore connecting with the survivors. I never see the human extent of the catastrophe, yet the entire world seems to collapse around me. I leave the auditorium with an ecstatic sense of immortality – I have cheated death, I have survived the end of the world. In contrast, as the credits close on Melancholia I feel I have been cheated of death. As the beautiful closing light sucks the colour from the film and Wagner’s music crescendos neither reach their conclusion before the fade to black. The audio-visual image seems transcendental, but never allows me to fully submerge in its glory. As Dr Alex Ling (University of West Sydney, Australia) noted that’s because Von Trier is continuously reminding us that his films are only movies. This is Otherness, this is fantasy, this is not my experience to claim.

film and media conference film studies phillip drummond toby miller

 Phillip Drummond and Toby Miller at the closing key note

Image: Victoria Grace Walden

 

 

By Mona Sakr

In a study by Bianchi-Berthouze et al. (2007), game-playing through a whole-body interface was compared with control through the hands. When participants in the study controlled the game (Guitar Hero) through their whole bodies, they reported more engagement, as well as displaying increased engagement through game-related body movements that were unnecessary for control (e.g. nodding their heads in time to the music).

Why were users more engaged when control of the game involved their whole bodies? Bianchi-Berthouze et al. suggested that the relationship came about as a result of increased affect.

Body Affect Engagement

By involving the body, the affective dimension of the experience increased, and in turn, this impacted upon engagement. Shouse (2005, p. 5) defines affect as a ‘non-conscious experience of intensity; it is a moment of unformed and unstructured potential’. Why does involving the body to a greater extent increase the affective response? And what are the implications of this relationship for the design of technologies and pedagogy?

Bianchi-Berthouze, N., Kim, W. W., & Patel, D. (2007) Does body movement engage you more in digital game play? And Why? Proceedings of the International Conference of Affective Computing and Intelligent Interaction (102-113) 

By Victoria Grace Walden

I’ve always been a critic of 3-D technology because I feel it distracts from the verisimilitude. However, recent experiences of 3-D films have made me ponder whether they do offer spectators a sensual experience more similar to real world perception than 2-D films.

Those who champion 3-D filmmaking seem to imply this argument. Just before the release of his 3-D spectacular Avatar, James Cameron proclaimed: “We are born seeing in three dimensions… most animals have two eyes, not one. There is a reason.”  (http://www.guardian.co.uk/film/2009/aug/20/james-cameron-avatar-3d-film)

Interestingly, the free dictionary defines third-dimensional not only as added depth, but added realism too:

“third dimension

n.

1. The quality of depth or thickness in an object or a space.

2. The quality of seeming real or lifelike.”

(http://www.thefreedictionary.com/third-dimensional )

Previously I, like many critics of the technology, could never understand this belief. How could this awkward, often unfocused, image be more “lifelike” than then 2-dimensional cinematic images we were used to?

In December 2012 I was fortunate to receive tickets to the Premiere of Ang Lee’s Life of Pi. I’d heard great things about the film so was naturally excited. However, my experience of the screening (which was in 3-D much to my dismay) was an unpleasant one, but one that emphasised how affect is always an embodied and pre-logical experience. I have problems with my peripheral vision and suffer from astigmatism therefore me and 3-D glasses do not have a happy relationship. While the beautiful, fairly still sequences of the zoo in the opening of the film were spectacular to watch, as soon as Pi was lost at sea I felt an overwhelming sense of nauseous. The experience was so unpleasant I missed the majority of the film, opting instead to stare at the floor or close my eyes in fear I may vomit. I felt physically unwell even after the film had ended and I had left the auditorium.  The motion of the train journey home only emphasised the sickly feeling.

This rather unpleasant cinematic encounter reminded me of the importance of considering affect as a pre-logical attribute of the film (and in fact any) experience.  Eric Shouse (2005) and Brian Massumi (1980) are clear to differentiate between feeling, emotion and affect. As Shouse explains, “a feeling is a sensation that has been checked against previous experience and labelled” therefore infants cannot experience feelings (Shouse, 2005:3). While “an emotion is the projection / display of a feeling” which can be genuine or faked to correlate with social expectations (Shouse, 2005:4). However, “an affect is a non-conscious experience of intensity; it is a moment of unformed and unstructured potential” (Shouse, 2005: 5).

Eisenstein also highlights that sensation differs from cognitive understanding because it returns us to a pre-evolved state: socially, before man formed linguistic structures and individually, that infant state before we learnt social norms of behaviour and language (As Shouse echoes in his paper). While Eisenstein uses the term “emotion” in his writing, his concept of “emotion” is not dissimilar from contemporary notions of “affect”.  The term “affect” only became widely used after Silvan Tomkin’s seminal work Affect Imagery Consciousness (1961-63).

I argue therefore, that 3-D does not make the image appear more “lifelike” but rather 3-D technology submerses the spectator in a lifelike sensual experience. While Ang Lee’s use of 3-D resulted in me being distracted not only from the verisimilitude, but the entire film experience, the technology caused a physical response in me unlike any 2-D film I’d ever seen. I’ve often, momentarily, recoiled or jumped when watching 2-D films, but never felt physically sick and the affect has never continued beyond my leaving the auditorium.

When I first became interested in questions of embodiment I wondered how my body and the bodies I encounter (virtual or real) could affect and be affected. What could the connection between the body and affect be? What I have come to understand is that embodiment is central to affect, affect is my body’s response – my body’s way of thinking.

References

Massumi, B (1980) Introduction in Deleuze, G & Guattari, F A Thousand Plateaus, London, UK & New York, USA: Continuum

Shouse, E (2005) Feeling, Emotion, Affect in M/C Journal: A Journal of Media and Culture Vol 8 Issue 6 Dec 2005 accessed at: http://www. journal.media-culture.org.au/0512/03-shouse.php

Smith, G.M (2004) Moving Explosions: Metaphors of Emotion in Sergei Eisenstein’s Writings in Quartley Review of Film and Video 21.4 (October- November 2004) pp305-315 accessed at: www2.gsu.edu/~jougms/Eisenstein.htm

Also, for an interesting article on 3-D and haptic visuality see:

Ross (2012) The 3-D aesthetic: Avatar and hyperhaptic visuality in Screen 53:4 Winter 2012 pp 381- 397 accessed at: http://screen.oxfordjournals.org/content/53/4/381.full.pdf+html?sid=11bcd8eb-c502-4bd1-bade-5146c161d780

By Mona Sakr

Yesterday, MODE hosted a training day on embodiment in digital environments. The day was brimming with ideas, approaches and contexts. They all stemmed however, from the central concept that the body plays an essential role in human experience – so essential that theoretical divides between mind and body are difficult, if not impossible, to make.

Digital environments highlight the need to prioritise the body and help to explain why embodiment as a framework has become increasingly popular over the last twenty years. But these environments also call into question the very idea of the body (ie. what we mean by ‘body’) and its role in learning and experience. They enable us to grapple in new ways with old ideas about embodiment, and at the same time they demand that we ask new questions about embodiment as a concept and theory.

New and old questions about embodiment were explored through a wide range of research contexts as represented by the day’s speakers and in the mini-workshops:

  • Caroline Pelletier questioned what it means to represent the body realistically in the context of surgical simulation, and the different genres of representation that can be invoked in such environments.
  • Carey Jewitt and Sara Price looked at the positioning of the body in children’s scientific inquiry using tangible technologies. Using multimodal analysis, they demonstrated the importance of the body for setting the rhythm and pace of social interaction and learning.
  • Anton Franks and Andrew Burns introduced the concepts of frame, affect, action, role and voice in analysing the computer games that young people construct.
  • Niall Winters introduced the possibility that individuals’ tactical spatial practices are changed through their use of mobile technologies. Participants in the seminar had hands-on experience of how this might happen by exploring the area surrounding the London Knowledge Lab while using apps that encourage users to engage with space differently.